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INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary memory models have conceptualized 
the long-term storage of memories as a collection of 
attributes that serve to discriminate one memory from 
another (e.g., Underwood, 1969). When we retrieve a 
particular memory, we may recall not on1y the occurrence 
of some past event, but also some idea as to when the 
event happened (temporal attribute), where it occurred 
(spatial attribute), as weli as verbal and nonverbal 
associations of the memory (associative attributes). 
According to this perspective, a memory cannot be retrieved 
without its attributes, since the attributes are the only 
l 
means by which one memory is identified as being separate 
from all other memories. 
The present paper deals mainly with the temporal 
attribute of memory. The reasons for this interest are 
twofold. First, there is sound empirical evidence to 
suggest that a temporal attribute plays a fundamentally 
important role in memory retrieval. Underwood (1969}, 
for example, reported that by increasing the time interval 
between paired-associate lists, inter-list interference 
was drastically reduced (i.e., the increased temporal 
separation resulted in discriminable temporal attributes 
associated with each list). Likewise, Light and Schurr 
(1973) demonstrated that providing subjects with temporal 
cues in a recognition memory task (by having test items 
presented in the same temporal order in which they were 
1 
studied) significantly improved their performance. 
A second reason for investigating the temporal 
attribute stems from the fact that it has received rel-
atively little theoretical or empirical attention. Tul-
ving and Madigan (1970), after a thorough review of the 
pertinent literature, concluded that psychologists have 
been somewhat reluctant to_incorpor~te the temporal attri-
bute within any precise theoretical framewor~. Thus, vir-
tually nothing is known about how temporal information is 
stored in memory, or how it operates as an effective dis-
criminative cue. 
Beginnings of Empirical Research 
A test paradigm appropriate for the empirical in-
vestigation of the temporal attribute, usually referred 
to as a "judgment of recency task," was introduced by 
Yntema and Trask (1963). In this study, a long list of 
words printed singly on index cards was inspected by sub-
jects, each at his own pace. Interspersed among study 
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words were test cards, each one containing two words fol-
lowed by a question mark. When a test card appeared, subjects 
were asked to choose the word that occupied the more recent 
position in the preceding inspection series. Test pairs 
were constructed so that either one or both of the test 
items actually appeared in the inspection series. In cases 
where only one member of the test pair appeared in the 
series, subjects were instructed to consider "new" test items 
--
as having occurred "very many words ago." 
By the method outlined above, Yntema and Trask 
wished to assess two major components of recency discrim-
ination: (a) separation interval, or the number of items 
that intervened between the inspection of each word com-
prising a test pair; and (b) lag, the number of items that 
intervened between the time of inspection and the time of 
test for the more recent member of a test pair. The range 
of lag and separation values manipulated in the Yntema and 
Trask study was considerable, with the lowest value at 4 
items, and the highest value reaching 136 items. It was 
found _that recency judgments, which were far better than 
chance at all lag and separation values, became more accur-
ate as the separation interval increased, but less accurate 
as the lag interval increased. 
On the basis of their results, Yntema and Trask con-
cluded that.the temporal attribute of memory is represented 
by hypothetical "time tags" that a subject examines to 
determine the relative recencies of past events. It was 
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also suggested that time, or something correlated with time, 
comprises the time tags in memory. Thus, the observed effect 
for separation interval was explained by the fact that values 
for this interval are p~rfectly correlated with time. That 
is, the larger the interval between members of a test pair, 
the larger the time difference between their occurrence, and 
presumably, the more discriminable their time tags would be. 
Likewise, as the time interval between the time of study and 
the time of test (lag) increases, the discriminability 
of the time tags associated with test items must decline; 
and this was suggested to account for the observed lag 
effect. 
The concept of time tags, as presented in Yntema 
and Trask (1963), has been criticized by a number of cog-
nitive ps~chologists. Murdock (1914), for example, argues 
that it is merely a descripti~e label, pointing to the fact 
that people can discriminate memories on the basis of re-
cency. Also, Estes .(1972) concluded that the notion of 
time tags does not address itself to the problem of ex-
plaining how temporal information is represented in memory; 
and it is, therefore, atheoretical speculation. 
Despite these criticisms, however, the concept of 
time tags has stimulated further research into the problem 
of recency. Moreover, because of the theoretical weak-
nesses of the time tags hypothesis, psychologists from vari-
ous theoretical backgrounds have sought to find a better, 
alternative explantion. Among the alternatives offered, 
two major hypotheses (the strength hypothesis and the con-
text hypothesis) have emerged as rival explanations for 
recency phenomena. Each of these hypotheses will now be 
reviewed in detail. 
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TWO ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES FOR RECENCY 
~ St~ength [ypothesis 
Strength theory represents a comprehensive model of 
memory that has been formally presented elsewhere (Anderson 
& Bower, 1972; Kintsch, 1970; Murdock, 1974; Wickelgren, 1970). 
However, there are three assumptions of this model that are 
pertinent to understanding the strength hypothesis for re-
cency. First, it is assumed that a memory is stored as ar-.; 
single, unidimensional "trace." The exact nature of a trace 
is not specifically defined, other than the fact that it is 
thought to bear some physiological relationship to central 
neural circuits. 
Second, it is thought that activation (i.e., retrieval) 
of a memory trace is accompanied by an implicit and direct 
estimate of its strength. The concept of trace strength 
has been rather loosely defined, but it is often equated 
with the variable of familiarity; the stronger the memory 
trace, the more familiar the memory represented by the trace 
appears •. Trace strength is also presumed to have a direct 
influence upon the ease with which items are retrieved from 
memory. Strength theorists generally infer that the easier 
it is to recall or recognize an item, the stronger its trace 
strength must be. 
The third and most important assumption of the model 
is that trace strength diminishes, in either discrete or 
continuous fashion, with the passage of time. The strength 
5 
hypothesis for recency grew directly from this assumption, 
and it was summarized succinctly by Konorski (1961): 
We have a strong inclination to believe that the "sense 
of time" of men and other animals i.e., the sense of 
varying durations of time which have elapsed since a 
definitive event, is based on nothing else than the 
strength of traces left by this event at various moments 
after its cessation. The weaker these traces the more 
remote in time the given event seems to be. (p. 122) 
Thus, according to the strength hypothesis, recency judg-
ments are mediated by the single variable of trace strength, 
" 
and are considered to be the by-products of the trace decay 
process. 
The strength hypothesis, as outlined above, has gen-
erated three major predictions for recency phenomena. The 
first prediction specifies that variables such as frequency 
and repetition, which are thought to increase the strength 
of memory traces, should also enhance the apparent recency 
of memories represented by such traces. To test this pre-
diction, Peterson (1967) devised a recency task in which a 
long list of verbal stimuli were presented at a fixed rate. 
At various times throughout the inspection list, subjects 
were shown a test word that had been seen in the preceding 
series, and were required to estimate lag, or the number of 
items that had occurred since the test word was last seen. 
The major independent variable in this study was stimulus 
frequency, the number of times test words were repeated in 
the inspection series before the time of test. Half of the 
items were seen only once, whereas the other half were seen 
twice before appearing as a test item. Lag intervals ranged 
6 
from 2 to 8 items, and the first and second presentations 
of repeated items were separated by four intervening words. 
If the strength hypothesis was correct, repeated items 
should have stronger traces than nonrepeated ones, and, 
therefore, should appear more recent than nonrepeated items. 
7 
Contrary to this prediction, however, no significant 
differences between_repeated and nonrepeated items were ob--
served. To interpret this finding, Peterson modified the 
strength hypothesis to suggest that items repeated in a 
spaced fashion (i.e., repetitions separated by several inter-
Q 
vening items) result in two separate traces with strengths 
no greater than singly presented items. Since the repeated 
items in that study were presented in a spaced manner, their 
lag estimates did not differ from the once-presented items 
for the simple reason that their trace strengths were not 
appreciably different. 
It was further suggested that items presented in a 
massed condition (i.e., repetitions in successive order) 
would result in a slligle, strengthened trace, relative to 
the traces of spaced items. Thus, it was predicted that 
massed items should appear more recent than spaced items at 
the same lag interval. In a later experiment (Peterson, 
Johnson, & Coatney, 1969) this prediction was tested, and 
it was found that Peterson's hypothesis was confirmed. The 
lag estimates for massed items were significantly smaller 
than those for spaced items. 
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When reviewing the Peterson experiments, one should 
note that the test paradigm differed somewhat from the task 
originally introduced by Yntema and Trask (1963). Peterson 
observed absolute judgments of recency for individual stim-
uli, a task that does not entail the discrimination of re-
cency for two different test items (i.e., a comparative 
task-}-.-- Lockhart-{ 1968) was interested in seeing- whether -the 
strength hypothesis, which was tested by Peterson in an ab-
solute task, also accounts for recency data observed in a 
comparative task. To do this, Lockhart tested whether per-
formance by one groupcof subjects in an absolute task could 
predict the performance by another group in a comparative 
task. If comparative judgments are made on the basis of lag 
estimates for each member of a test pair, as the strength 
hypothesis implies, then a probability distribution gener-
ated from an absolute task should predict the data observed 
in a comparative one. Lockhart's data confirmed the- _strength 
model's predictions, and it was concluded that the processes 
envisaged by the strength hypothesis for absolute tasks also 
characterizes the processes involved in comparative ones. 
A second major prediction of the strength hypothesis 
pertains directly to comparative judgments of recency. Name-
ly, when two items of unequal strength are presented in a 
test pair, recency discrimination will be more accurate when 
the item with the stronger trace is actually the more recent 
member of the test pair. Likewise, if the stronger trace 
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precedes the weaker one in time, recency discrimination will 
be impaired. To test this prediction, Morton (1968) ob-
served comparative recency judgments llllder three experi-
mental conditions: (a) when the more recent item was repeated 
earlier in the inspection series; (b) when the less recent 
item was repeated; and (c) when neither item was repeated. 
According. to the. strength _hypothesis , __ repetition of the less 
recent member should increase its trace strength relative 
to the more recent one; hence, recency discrimination should 
be impaired under that condition. 
Test stimuli consisted of numerical digits presented 
auditorially in a series of 14 other d~gits. Digits that 
were repeated had only one item separating their first and 
second presentations. In agreement with the strength hy-
pothesis, Morton found that judgments were most accurate 
when the more recent item was repeated, and least accurate 
when the less recent item was repeated. 
Further evidence in support of this prediction has 
been found in cases where test stimuli were pictoral, rather 
than verbal in nature. It is a well-known fact that pic-
tures are easier to remember than words (e.g., Pavio, 1971). 
A strength theorist interprets this to mean that the trace 
strength of pictures declines less rapidly than that of 
verbal stimuli. As applied to recency judgments, the strength 
hypothesis predicts that pictures should appear relatively 
more recent than words at constant lag intervals. Fozard 
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and Weinert (1972) compared absolute judgments of recency 
for pictures and words, and found that at relatively short 
lags (13 to 14 items), pictures appeared more recent than 
words. At longer lags, however, the differences between 
pictures and words disappeared. Furthermore, Fozard (1970) 
observed comparative recency judgments when test pairs 
consistea.__of both_ a_ word and a picture._ It was found that 
recency discrimination was impaired when the more recent 
member was a word. This latter finding is in agreement 
with the Morton (1968) study, since it is assumed that the 
trace strength of a picture is stronger than that of a word. 
A third major prediction of the strength model in-
volves the relationship between trace decay and decision 
criteria that subjects use to transform values of strength 
into estimates of lag. Hinrichs (1970), by applying the 
principles of statistical decision theory, offered a des-
cription of this transformation process. He assumed that 
values of trace strength are normally distributed about 
mean values of lag. It was further assumed that subjects 
implicitly establish criterion values for strength that 
demarcate the range of values associated with each lag es-
timate. Thus, if the trace strength for a given stimulus 
falls short of, or exceeds a particular criterion value, the 
lag estimate for that stimulus is determined by the lag 
value associated with the range of strength values falling 
above or below that criterion. 
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According to the strength hypothesis, trace strength 
declines as a function of time, and is independent of any 
criteria subjects may use to mediate recency judgments. To 
test this assumption, Hinrichs (1970) deceived subjects into 
believing that the maximum lag interval they would exper-
ience in an absolute task was either 6, 9, or 12 items in 
length.- --Actually, the-maximum-possible-lag--was---alwaya 9 
items. By this deception, it was felt that the decision 
criteria were varied independently of the decay rate of 
trace strength. It was therefore predicted that the rate 
of trace decay, as evidenced by the rate with which mean 
estimates of lag declined with time, should be identical in 
all three deception conditions. The results fit the strength 
model's predictions, and Hinrichs concluded that trace 
strength declines independently of decision criteria. 
Critique of Strength Hypothesis 
Although the strength model has enjoyed some empirical 
verification, cogent arguments against its acceptance have 
been waged. Most adversaries have based their argument on 
the basic criticism that the strength hypothesis is far too 
simplistic. Its simplicity stems from the fact that it re-
lies exclusively upon the single variable of trace strength 
to explain recency data. In effect, the strength hypothesis 
denies the utility of all other attributes of memory that a 
person may use to determine an event's occurrence in time. 
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Such extreme simplicity often renders the strength hypothesis 
incapable of resolving some fundamental logical and empirical 
problems. 
Some of the logical problems attendant to the strength 
hypothesis were noted by Underwood (1969). One has only to 
reflect upon his own personal experiences to realize that 
some older __ memories_ appear_ to be much more_ vivid or _"stronger"_ 
ihan some more recent ones. Yet, we are still capable of 
remembering the temporal order from older to newer memories. 
If recency discrimination were based solely on trace strength, 
considerable disorientation in time would result. Therefore, 
the strength model is at a loss to explain how older, more 
vivid memories are kept in their proper temporal position. 
One of the most poignant statements of criticism again-
st· the strength hypothesis was presented by Tulving and Madi-
gan ( 1 970) : 
In our opinion, the strength hypothesis is a product of 
desparation. It is entirely possible that in the- absence 
of any other information the subject may correctly or 
incorrectly reason that of the two items, the one appear-
ing more familiar may look so because because it appeared 
more recently, but this does not mean that the subject 
has no access to more direct information about the temp-
oral code of an item in many other situations. (p. 463) 
In effect, Tulving and Madigan suggest that a simple, uni-
dimensional variable such as trace strength mediates recency 
judgments only when there are no other attributes associated 
with items stored in memory. Thus, it would be wrong to con-
clude that the sense of recency is due solely to the strength 
~ 
of traces representing stored memories. 
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In support of Tulving and Madigan's conclusion, it can 
be argued that the variable of trace strength accounts for 
recency data in only a few experimental settings. Moreover, 
many of the strength theorists' conclusions regarding the 
efficacy of the strength variable must be restricted to sit-
uations where only short lag intervals are being observed. 
A close ~xamination of much of the data ~ci:ted in support of 
the strength hypothesis reveals that at ~onger lag intervals, 
subjects were guessing their recency judgments. Hinrichs 
and Bushke (1968), for example, reported that the accuracy 
of lag estimates {in an absolute type of task) declined to 
chance performance at lag intervals greater than 8 items. 
Likewise, in the Morton (1968) study described earlier, sub-
jects were making comparative judgments of recency at no 
better than chance probability in two of the three experi-
mental conditions. As Underwood (1969) indicated, if sub-
jects are merely guessing their decisions, it is erroneous 
to conclude that any v.ariable, including trace strength, is 
responsible for the results. 
A second limitation to the conclusions of the strength 
theorists stems from the fact that their predictions have 
been upheld in only one type of experimental task, the con-
tinuous or probe type of task. Continuous tasks are char-
acterized by the fact that there is no temporal separation 
between the study and test phases. Recency judgments are 
made throughout the presentation of a long series of stim-
14 
uli. Bower (1972) has suggested that continuous tasks are 
"impoverished" in the sense that subjects are afforded lit-
tle opportunity to make recency judgments on factors other 
than familiarity or strength. This impoverishment is exem-
plified by the fact that there are no distinctive spatial 
or visual cues that would help discriminate one stimulus 
from another. Furthermore, the forced presentation rate, 
coupled with the temporal contiguity between the study and 
test phases, do not allow subjects the opportunity to cog-
nitively organize or rehearse the tested items. Given such 
circumstances, it is not surprising that subjects• perform-
ance rarely exceeds chance level at longer lags, or that the 
variable of trace strength stands out as the most likely 
explanation for the sense of recency. 
Continuous types of tasks, however, are by no means 
the only methods available for the investigation of recency 
phenomena. There is another class of tasks that can be 
termed "discrete" in that recency judgments are delayed until 
the completion _of the entire inspection series. Discrete 
tasks differ from continuous ones in two important ways: (a) 
lag intervals in discrete tasks can vary over a much wider 
range of values, from a few items to a few days; and (b) in 
discrete tasks, there is a clear temporal separation between 
the study and test phases of the experiment. Because of 
these characteristics, discrete tasks bear a stronger resem-
blance to real life in that recency judgments are made from 
a retrospective vantage point from which each item is con-
sidered as a member of an entire series of past events. 
There is a growing body of evidence to show that 
predictions of the strength hypothesis are not upheld in 
discrete types of tasks. Underwood (1969) cited several 
unpublished studies in which absolute judgments of recency 
were measured by having subjects identify the temporal po-
sition of stimuli with numbe}"S corresponding to each item's 
position in a presentation list. Test words differed from 
each other in terms of their study time, and it was found 
that the longer a word had been studied, the easier it was 
recalled on a later test. Strength theory interprets this 
to mean that' items studied for a longer time have stronger 
traces than items studied for shorter times. Accordingly, 
stronger items should appear more recent (i.e., assigned to 
more recent temporal positions) than weaker ones. Contrary 
15 
to the strength hypothesis' prediction, however, position 
judgments did not vary systematically with study time. Items 
studied for a longer time were not assigned to more recent 
serial positions. Underwood therefore concluded that there 
is no correlation between trace strength, as manipulated by 
study time, and judgments of recency. 
Another failure of the strength hypothesis was noted 
by Winograd (1968), who indirectly measured recency judg-
ments in a list discrimination task. Subjects were shown 
two word lists such that List 1 was presented in its entirety 
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a variable number of times before JJist 2 was presented. In 
some cases, List 1 was repeated 9 times more frequently than 
List 2 was presented. After List 2 was presented for the 
last time, subjects were asked to recall the presentation 
list in which test words appeared. Strength theory assumes 
that the trace strength of list items increases with the 
frequency_of repetition._ Thus, in _cases where the frequency 
of List 1 was much greater than that for List 2, list dis-
crimination should be impaired. This expectation is iden-
tical to the second major prediction of the strength hypo-
thesis outlined earlier (cf. Fozard, 1970; Morton, 1968). 
But, contrary to the strength hypothesis, Winograd found 
that the accuracy of list discrimination increased, rather 
than decreased, as the frequency of List 1 increased. 
Further evidence against the strength hypothesis has 
also been reported by Hintzman and Block (1971). In this 
study, subjects were shown a fairly long list of words,- and 
were later asked to recall the temporal position of test words 
randomly drawn from the presentation list. A horizontal line 
divided into ten equal segments was printed at the top of 
each answer sheet, and position judgments were made by assign-
ing a number from 1 to 10 that corresponded to the tenth of 
the list in which each test item appeared. It was found that 
I 
position judgments were far better for words from the be-
ginning of the list than those from the middle or latter 
portions. 
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This primacy effect observed by Hintzmah is difficult 
for the strength hypothesis to explain. If recency is rep-
resented in memory only by the strength of an exponentially 
decaying trace (cf. Hinrichs, 1970), it is not clear why 
the temporal positions of less recent items are better dis-
criminated than the temporal positions of more recent items. 
A strength theorist could atgu~_~hat items from the begin-
ning of a list have stronger traces (i.e., because of less 
Q 
interference) than items from other portions. But, in that 
case, the strength model would also have to predict that 
beginning items be assigned to more recent serial positions. 
Clearly, the data do not support any explanation offered by 
the strength hypothesis, and an alternative explanation is 
needed to account for Hintzman's primacy effect. 
~ Context Hypothesis 
The context model of memory differs from the strength 
model in several important ways. First, the context model 
assumes that a memory is multidimensional i.e., comprised of 
many discrete elements. The elements comprising a memory 
have been collectively termed the "stimulus-as-coded" (s-a-c), 
and are thought to represent stimulus features encoded into 
memory (Bower, 1972). Consequently, the representation of 
an item in memory depends upon the manner in which it was 
encoded. Further, encoding is assumed to depend upon a sub-
ject' a attentional set. 
--
The context model also assumes that associations are 
immediately and implicitly formed between a s-a-c and a 
multitude of other s-a-c's that correspond to contextual 
stimuli present at the time of encoding. Therefore, when 
an item is retrieved from memory, contextual elements asso-
ciated with the item are also retrieved. Recognition mem-
ory is seen to depend upon the retrieval of contextual 
associates. To recognize ~hat an item was seen before, one 
must implicitly realize, through contextual retrieval, that 
the item was seen in a previous context. 
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The context model, unlike the strength model, empha-
sizes the associative nature of memory to explain the sense 
of recency. As mentioned earlier, strength theory relies 
upon the single variable of trace strength to explain recency 
judgments. The context model, however, proposes that the 
sense of recency is mediated by the retrieval of a multitude 
of elements associated with an item in memory. 
Proponents of the context modei have suggested at least 
two ways in which a person utilizes contextual elements to 
mediate judgments of recency. The first method, which can 
be termed a "statistical scanning process," was proposed by 
Bower (1972) as an explanation for recency judgments measured 
in continuous types of tasks. When an item is presented for 
test, the subject supposedly is able to scan the set of re-
trieved elements and estimate the proportion that are "tagged" 
(i.e., associated with) to the item's previous experimental 
context. According to Bower, the greater the proportion of 
tagged elements found, the nore recent the item appears. 
It was further assumed that with longer time intervals be-
tween the item's presentation in the inspection series and 
test (lag), the elements tagged to the previous context 
would have a lower probability of being retrieved with the 
test item. __ Thus, for_ absolute judgments of recency, __ the __ 
greater the lag interval, the less recent the item appears. 
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As applied to comparative judgments of recency, the 
context hypothesis proposes that the test item having the 
greater proportion of tagged elements is the one that will 
appear more recent. As the separation interval between items 
to be compared increases, the greater the likelihood of dif-
ferences between the proportion of tagged elements retrieved 
with each item. Thus, the greater the separation interval 
between items to be compared, the more discriminable (in 
terms of recency) the test items become. The context model 
is therefore in agreement with the finding that recency dis-
crimination becomes more accurate as the separation interval 
increases (cf. Yntema and Trask, 1963). 
A second way in which subjects use contextual elements 
is through contextual "tags" or "markers." According to 
Anderson and Bower (1972), contextual tags are hypothetical 
labels that summarize and define a multitude of elements 
appearing within a discrete interval of time. The notion of 
contextual tags has been used to explain judgments of serial 
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position (e.g., Hintzman and Block, 1971). It is thought that 
"list tags" and "position tags" help a subject pinpoint the 
serial position in which an item appeared. As Anderson and 
Bower (1972) explained: 
The point of introducing associations to context is to 
provide a means-of keeping track of the occasions in 
which particular words appeared. This would be diffi-
cult to implement on the basis of direct associations 
between the word and the contextual elements. How 
would the subject know which contextual elements belonged 
to whic~ list? (p. 104) 
Presumably, the greater the differences between con-
texts encoded with list items, the more likely it is that 
subjects will tag them differentially. As a test of this 
prediction, Brown (1973b) asked school children to make com-
parative judgments of recency for pairs of picture stimuli 
presented under varying conditions of context. In the Vis-
ual condition, each group of 8 items was presented in dif-
ferent spatial locations representing various points along 
a child's journey to school (e.g., house, garden, street etc.). 
In the List condition, pictures were shown in blocks of 8 
items, but without extra spatial cues. Finally, in the 
Blank condition, all pictures were pres,ented in an uninter-
1 
rupted series. 
The results were in total agreement with the predictions 
of the context model. For older children, recency discrim-
ination was better in the Visual condition (77%) than in 
either the List (69%) or Blank (63%) conditions. Further-
more, judgments were most accurate when the pictures com-
prising test pairs came from different contexts. In the 
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Visual condition, for example, performance was 85% accurate 
when items came from different contexts; whereas, judgments 
were only 52% accurate when no such contextual differences 
existed. These findings were later replicated when context 
was varied by having different colored backgrounds for 
blocks of study items (Brown, Campione, and Gilliard, 1974). 
Evaluation of the Context Hypothesis 
" 
The context model, unlike the strength model, can pro-
vide explanations for recency data from a variety of exper-
imental tasks. The theoretical superiority of the context 
model in this respect can be demonstrated by reviewing two 
studies mentioned earlier. First, in the Winograd (1968) 
study, the strength model would have erroneously predicted 
that list discrimination would decrease as the frequency of 
List 1 increased. The context model, on the other hand, 
could argue that the probability of retrieving the List 1 
tag would increase with the frequency of its repetition. 
Thus, the context model would agree with the Winograd data 
showing improved list discrimination with List 1 repetitions. 
Second, Underwood (1969) observed that the strength 
model incorrectly predicted that "strong" items presented 
at the beginning of the list would appear more recent than 
"weaker" items from the end of the list. According to the 
context model, however, the strength or vividness of an 
item has no bearing on its apparent recency other than to 
" 
the degree to which vividness influences the formation of 
discriminable list markers. Thus, the context model would 
not contradict our personal observations that temporal or-
ientation is preserved, even though past events differ in 
terms of their vividness or familiarity. 
In light of the above discussion, the context hypo-
thesis appears to be a desirable .. al terna.:ti ve to_ the _overly-
simplistic notions of strength theory. On the negative 
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side, however, the context model has suffered one major 
criticism. Namely, the term "context" has been treated in 
much too general: a fashion. "¢ontext," as it was originally 
described by Anderson and Bower (1972), encompasses an almost 
unlimited variety of elements, ranging from internal physio-
logical cues, to the physical parameters of the external 
environment. According to Brown (1973a), the context model 
has thus far been unable to specify which, among the multi-
tude of contextual elements, are most influential in the for-
mation of list or position tags. As Wells (1974) pointed out: 
The nature of contextual tags needs careful specification 
to avoid the emptiness of the statement that one re-
members context because one remembers contextual infor-
mation. (p. 390) 
ON THE NATURE OF CONTEXTUAL TAGS 
Hintzman, Block, and Summers (1973), in a study of 
serial list and position judgments, attempted to clarify the 
nature of contextual tags, at least as they operate in stud-
ies of position knowledge. Subjects were shown four word 
lists separated by a 2.5 minute recognition test. After the 
last list was shown, serial position judgments were measured 
by having subjects indicate both the list and within-list 
position in which test items appeared. 
There were three major findings in this study. First, 
there were primacy and recency effects. The positions of 
items from the beginning and end of the inspection series 
were better discriminated than thosecfrom other portions of 
the series. The recency effect, however, was found to be 
transitory in that prolonging the time interval between the 
study and test phases of the experiment attenuated it. Sec-
ond, errors of list discriniination tended to fall in lists 
that were in closest temporal proximity to the target list. 
Third, when an error of list membership occurred, the with-
" 
in-list position judgments tended to remain accurate. This 
last finding contradicts an explicit prediction of strength 
I 
theory; an item assigned to the wrong list should also be 
assigned to a within-list position that is temporally closest 
to its actual within-list position. 
To explain these results, Hintzman postulated the 
existence of at least two types of contextual tags, each one 
referring to a particular subset of contextual elements. 
23 
24 
The first type (Type A) referred to contextual elements that 
might, for example, define subjects' feelings of boredom dur-
ing the encoding process. Hintzman further assumed that Type 
A elements change in a regular fashion according to a neg-
atively function of time in an experiment. Therefore, Type 
A elements are assumed to change more quickly in the begin-
ning of an experiment, and, thus, may explain the primacy 
effect. Moreover, if Type A tags change more quickly in the 
beginning of a presentation series than at the middle or end, 
then the positions of items in the beginning would be more 
discriminable than those from other portions. 
Type A elements were also used to explain errors in 
list discrimination. These elements are presumably insensi-
tive to list boundaries i.e., the rate at which they change 
does not correspond to the rate at which the stimulus series 
changes from one list to another. However, Type A elements 
retrieved with items from two consecutive lists might be quite 
similar to each other. It would, therefore, be reasonable to 
expect that list errors fall in lists that are in closest tem-
poral proximity to the target list. 
A second type of contextual marker (Type B) hypothe-
sized by Hintzman reflects a subset of elements that describe 
the "cognitive environment" in which lists were processed. 
These elements may be associated with the degree of cognitive 
load or strain felt by subjects in the processing of each 
list. Type B elements were assumed to change in a regular 
Q 
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fashion during the presentation of a single list, but the 
original elements are reinstated whenever a new list is be-
gun. Consequently, items from different lists, but with the 
same within-list position, share similar Type B elements 
(e.g., all beginning items might be associated with a mini-
mum. amount of strain, and end items a greater amount). Type 
B elements are used_ to _explain_the. tendency __ for within-list __ _ 
judgments to remain accurate when errors in list discrim-
ination are made. 
On the basis of Hintzman's interpretations, certain 
tentative hypotheses can be formulated regarding the nature 
of serial list and position tags: (a) List and position tags 
are derived from contextual elements that describe subjects' 
internal, as opposed to external environment; (b) These ele-
ments must bear some logical correspondance with the passage 
of time (e.g., the greater the feeling of boredom, the long-
er the time spent in the· experiment); (c) The discriminabil-
ity of list tags are dependent upon the rate at which Type 
A elements charige through time; the faster the rate of 
change, the more discrimin~ble the tags. The rate of Type A 
change is, in turn, a function of time in a particular exper-
imental setting; (d) The discriminability of position tags 
is dependent upon both the regularity with which Type B ele-
ments change within all lists (so that position tags are 
equivalent in all lists), and the degree to which Type B 
elements vary within each list (so that beginning tags are 
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different from middle and end tags). 
The Present Experiment 
Given Hintzman's interpretations of contextual tags, 
the present experiment was designed to study how certain var-
iables of stimulus presentation would affect the discrimin-
abili ty Qf list_ and_ pos_i tion _:tags_ in judgments of serial po-
sition. With regard to list tags, Hintzman hypothesized 
" 
that the rate at which Type A elements change in an experi-
ment is a negatively accelerated function of time in an ex-
periment. This hypothesis, however, was offered as a post-
hoc explanation for data collected in a study where certain 
.,standard" conditions of stimulus presentation prevailed. 
Moreover, Hintzman's subjects viewed stimuli presented at a 
constant rate of duration (5 sec. per item), and with the 
same type of fill~r task (recognition memory test) interven-
ing between lists. It could be argued that such conditions 
fostered a feeling of monotony or boredom (e.g., Type A ele-
ments) that might asYillptote relatively early in the experi-
ment. If presentation conditions were changed so that the 
experiment seemed less monotonous, it would be reasonable to 
expect list discrimination to improve. This would be a neces-
sary correlate because the slope of the function describing 
Type A change would asymptote earlier in the experiment than 
under less monotonous conditions. 
In the present study, three variables of stimulus pre-
sentation, presumed to influence contextual elements, were 
independently manipulated in a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design. 
The first variable was the type of filler task intervening 
between lists. In the Same task condition, subjects worked 
on an identical type of task between the presentation of 
each list. In the Different task condition, a different 
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kind of task separated four presentation lists. It was felt 
that the Different condition would influence position knowl-
edge in two ways. First, it might lessen the monotony of the 
experiment by the introduction of challenging, new tasks 
throughout the presentation series. Second, since each task 
represented a different cognitive activity, they might also 
provide subjects with a set of labels to differentially mark 
time during the presentation phase of the experiment. It was 
therefore hypothesized that list judgments.in the Different 
condition would be better than those in the Same task con-
dition. 
The second variable manipulated in this study was total 
study time. In the Long time condition, subjects viewed each 
stimulus for an average of 8 seconds, in the Short condition, 
5 seconds. The time interval between lists was held constant 
for both levels of this variable. Thus, the entire presenta-
tion phase for Long groups was 1.3 times longer than that 
for Short groups. It was hypothesized that the Short groups 
would do better in list discrimination than Long groups. In 
the Short condition, a greater proportion of stimuli would be 
28 
presented before any negatively accelerating function could 
asymptote. Thus, more of the items in the Short condition 
would be presented under a relatively "fast" rate of change 
than items in the Long condition. It can also be seen that 
the superiority of the Short study time should be most appar-
ent in the beginning of the series (i.e., items from the lat-
ter part of the series would correspond' with any asymptote of 
subjective eiperience). 
The third variable manipulated was presentation pattern. 
As mentioned earlier, most studies of serial position have 
employed a constant rate of stimulus presentation. In the 
present experiment, the Constant condition of presentation 
pattern repeated this practtce. In the Varied condition, on 
the other hand, subjects in the Short condition viewed stim-
uli for either 3, 5, or 7 seconds, so that an average of 5 
seconds per item in each list was achieved. Subjects in the 
Long condition were shown stimuli for either 6, 8, or 10 sec-
onds, resulting in an average of 8 seconds per item per list. 
There is considerable psychophysiological evidence to sug-
gest that subjects' attentional state would be heightened un-
der a Varied condition. Sokolv (1963), for example, has re-
ported that when a long series of similar stimuli are shown 
at a constant rate, the physiological correlates of subjects' 
orienting response {i.e., attention) quickly habituate. How-
ever, when the duration of a stimulus changes from that of a 
preceding item, as in a varied condition, the orienting re-
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sponse quickly recovers. As applied to tests of serial po-
sition, Sokolv's data implies that the Type A function, hy-
pothesized by Hintzman, Block, and Summers (1973), would 
asymptote at a later point in the Varied condition than in 
the Constant condition. Therefore, it was hypothesized that 
a varied presentation pattern would result in better list 
discrimination than a constant one. 
Of the three variables just described, only one ~as 
expected to have any influence on within-list position tags. 
Hintzman, Block, and Summers suggested that Type B elements 
reflect the degree of cognitive load or strain experienced 
during each lists' processing. There are probably a num-
ber of variables affecting the cognitive load associated 
with list processing. For example, the number of items. in 
each list, the particular task demands, and the time it takes 
to process each list are only a few such variables. In the 
present expe~iment1 it was reasoned that with the number of 
list items and task demands held constant, subjects in the 
Long condition would experience a greater degree of cogni-
tive strain, particularly at the end of each list, than sub-
jects in the Short condition. Moreover, in the Long condition, 
subjects would have to process each list over a much longer 
time interval than subjects in the Short condition. Thus, 
subjects in the Long condition would probably experience 
greater fatigue or "strain" at the end of each list than sub-
jects in the Short condition. Consequently, there would be 
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a greater disparity between the Type B elements associated 
with beginning, middle, and end items in the Long condition. 
It was therefore hypothesized that the within-list position 
judgments in the Long condition would be more accurate than 
in the Short condition. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
A total of 144 subjects, recruited from the under-
graduate subject pool at Loyola University, were observed. 
Eighteen subjects were randomly assigned to each of the 8 
experimental conditions. 
Stimuli 
" 
Stimuli were 72 black-and-white photographs of objects 
likely to be seen in an urban environment {e.g., telephone 
booth, barber pole, etc.). All stimuli were screened before-
hand to insure that none represented a landmark scene famil-
iar to subjects. 
In many studies of serial position knowledge, verbal 
stimuli have been used. There were two important reasons that 
prompted the use of pictures in the present study. First, it 
was essential that the stimuli have a high probability of be-
ing recognized during the test phase. According to the con-
text model of memory, an item is n9t recognized unless con-
textual associates are retrieved. Since the present study was 
l 
designed to investigate the effects of some variables on con-
textual tags, it was necessary that the position judgments 
reflect decisions for items recognized as having appeared in 
the experiment i.e., items whose contextual tags were retriev-
ed. It is a well-known fact that pictures have a higher prob-
ability of recognition than words {Shepard, 1967; Standing, 
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Conezio, and Haber, 1970). 
The second reason for using pictures stems from the 
fact that the present study was designed to observe groups 
with different study times. It was therefore necessary to 
insure that recognition memory did not vary with stimulus 
duration. Pavio (1971) reported that recognition memory 
for pictures does not vary ~ith durations gr~ater than 3 
seconds. To verify this prediction, a pilotQstudy was con-
ducted in which 68 pic~ures, to be used in the present ex-
periment, were viewed for two different durations. Half of 
the subjects (N = 20) saw each picture for 4 seconds, and 
the other half saw each picture for 8 seconds. The results 
confirmed Pavio's prediction. The hit rate for old items 
in a two-alternative forced choice recognition test was 93%, 
with no sienificant differences between long and short dur-
ations, F(1,18) = .334. 
Presentation Lists 
The 72 pictures were shown in four lists of 18 items 
each. Each of the three stimulus durations to be observed 
in the Varied condition were randomly assigned to positions 
within each list so that in each block of 6 items (corre-
sponding to the beginning, middle, or end of each list) a 
different duration occupied each odd-numbered position. 
This restriction was imposed so that within each list, all 
stimulus durations were equally represented within all with-
in-list positions (i.e., beginning, middle, and end), result-
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ing in a constant study time for all four lists. 
To control for any confounding effects due to the or-
der of stimulus presentation, three different stimulus series 
were constructed according to the following criteria. First, 
each stimulus occupied either an odd-numbered or even-num-
bered position across all three stimulus series. This re-
stric~ion foll9wed from the fact that only _odd-numbered stim-
uli served as test items, and it was essential that all sub-
jects were tested on the same items. Second, the duration 
assigned to each stimulus in the Varied condition remained 
constant across each of the three series. Thus, the order 
in which the presentation rate varied in all three series 
remained the same (i.e., each of the durations in the Varied 
condition was assigned a series position, and in each of the 
thr~e stimulus series, items were assigned positions that had 
the same duration). Third, each stimulus appeared in a dif-
ferent list in each series. Each stimulus series was equally 
represented in all experimental conditions. 
Every stimulus occupying an odd-numbered position in 
the presentation series was used in the test series. There-
fore, each list and within-list position in the presentation 
series was equally represented in the test list. To control 
for confounding effects due to test order, three different 
series were constructed so that: (a) 
I ,,... - & ,.....i 
" 
consisted of a beginning, middle, and end item from each of 
the four presentation lists; and (b) Within each block of 
12 items, every duration used in the varied condition was 
equally represented. 
Materials 
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Three-types of filler __ tasks_ were _chosen to fulfill 
three criteria: (a) Completipn of each task did not require 
detailed instructions. Thus, subjects could spend a maxi-
mum amount of time working on the task, rather than focusing 
on task instructions; (b) Each type of task to be used in 
the Different condition involved a distinctly different cog-
nitive activity. The first type was spatial (maze puzzle), 
the second type verbal (a vocabulary test used for graduate 
admissions), and the third type was mathematical (algebra 
problems); (c) Each type of task was challenging enough to 
prevent completion within the time interval allotted. 
To record serial position judgments, subjects were 
asked to make a slash mark on a horizontal line (one for 
each test item) divided into four equal segments. Each con-
secutive segment corresponded to one of the four presenta-
tion lists. .The segments corresponding to each list were 
further subdivided into three equal parts representing the 
beginning, middle, and end of each list. Thus, the accuracy 
of list and position judgments could be ascertained by not-
ing whether the slash marks were placed in the appropriate 
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list and within-list segment. 
Besides serial position judgments, the test sheets 
also contained a 5-point scale representing the confidence 
of subjects' judgments. If the subject felt he was guessing, 
he was to circle Number 1. All other numbers indicated 
ascending degrees of confidence, with Number 5 reflecting 
decisions for which subjects were "Very Sure." 
Procedure 
Subjects were seen in pairs and were given the fol-
lowing instructions prior to viewing the presentation series: 
This is an experiment dealing with the relationship be-
tween human memory and certain mental aptitudes. You 
will be shown a fairly long series of pictures. Please 
pay close attention, because your memory for these pic-
tures will be tested later in the experiment. 
At various times throughout the picture series, the pic-
tures will stop. When this happens, you are to begin 
work on a paper-and-pencil task that I will give to you. 
The instructions for each task are simple, and must be 
read quickly and silently. I will not entertain any 
questions either before or during each task•- You will 
have a limited amount of time on each test, so work as 
quickly and effeciently as you can. When I tell you to 
stop, cease what you're doing immediately, and put the 
test face down in front of you. The pictures will then 
resume, and you will not return to the task once I've 
told you to stop. When the last picture in the series 
is shown, I'll give you further instructions. 
Several aspects of these instructions should be noted. 
First, subjects did not know the nature of the serial posi-
tion test during the presentation phase of the experiment. 
This was done to prevent subjects from using encoding stra-
tegies that may not generalize to real world settings. Sec-
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ond, subjects were led to believe that the tasks represented 
measures of their mental aptitudes. By doing this, it was 
hoped that their involvement and attention with each task 
would be maximum. 
Pictures :i.n the presentation series were shown on a 
Kodak Carousel projector, and the presentation rates were 
automatically timed. The filler tasks were administered 
after the first, second; and third lists. Subjects were 
given 2 min. to work on each test. In the Same task condi-
tion, three different samples of one type of task_~ere given, 
and each type of task (i.e., spatial, verbal, and mathematical) 
was used equally often in that condition. In the Different 
task condition, a sample of each of the three types of tasks 
were given. Three different orders of task administration 
were used equally often: spatial-verbal-math; math-spatial-
verbal; verbal-math-spatial. 
After the last list was presented, there was a 2 min. 
period prior to test in which answer sheets were distributed 
and test instructions given. During the test phase, each of 
the 36 test items was presented for 10 sec. 
RESULTS 
Serial position judgments were scored according to 
three criteria of accuracy, each criterion being treated as 
a separate dependent variable in the analyses. These cri-
teria were: (a) List accuracy-was the list in which an item 
appeared remembered?; (b) Position accuracy-was the within-
list position remembered (i.e., beginning, middle, or end), 
even though the item might have been placed in the wrong 
list?; (c) List-Plus accuracy-was both the list and within-
list position of a test item recalled? 
These criteria were used for two basic reasons. First, 
it was assumed that each criterion represented a different 
aspect of contextual retrieval. Successful list judgments 
presumably require the retrieval of list tags, position judg-
ments require within-list position tags, and List-Plus accur-
acy requires both types of tags. Second, the criteria were 
viewed as representing varying degrees of task difficulty 
(with List-Plus the most difficult), and were therefore in-
cluded to assess the degree to which the experimental var-
iables might affect judgments differentially. 
An examination of subjects' raw scores indicated that 
position knowledge was better than chance for each of the 
three criteria. For List accuracy, the mean number correct, 
out of a possible 36, was 16.5 (chance = 9.0). The corre-
sponding means for the Position and List-Plus criteria were 
14.0 (chance= 12.0), and 7.0 (chance= 3.0) respectively 
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(see Table 1). 
Subjects' raw scores were transformed to response prob-
abilities. Moreover, subjects' list and position judgments 
were not evenly distributed among all possible response cat-
egories. With regard to list assignments, for example, sub-
jects assigned items to Lists 2 and 3 far more frequently than 
to Lists 1 or 4. Also, the within-list assignments were bi-
ased in favor of the middle positions (see Table 2). 
" 
The uneven distribution among response categories was 
interpreted to mean that subjects exhibited a guessing bias 
for this particular task. Thus, to appropriately test the 
hypotheses of the present experiment, it was first necessary 
to correct each subject's score for his particular guessing 
bias (e.g., the raw number correct of list judgments for List 
3 items might be greater than that for List 1; but such a 
difference would be due to the fact that when guessing, sub-
jects tend to assign items to List 3 rather than to List 1). 
A correction for guessing was used in which the raw scores 
for each of the scoring criteria were transformed by dividing 
the raw number correct for a given list and/or position, by 
the frequency with which a subject used the list and/or po-
sition as a response category. This resulted in post-hoc 
probabilities of a correct response (cf. Hintzman et al., 
1973). 
Following the above transformations, the response prob-
abilities for each of the three scoring criteria were separ-
39 
TABLE 1 
RAW NUMBER CORRECT BY GROUPS 
List Positioh List-Plus 
Group M SD M SD M SD 
Long 
Same-Con. 16.6 (3.6) 13.8 (3.0) 7 .() (2.8) 
Same-Var. 16.3 (3.4) 14 .1 (3.5) 1.2 (2.8) 
Di ff-Con. 16.2 (3.5) 14.6 (2.2) 6.9 (2.5) 
Diff-Var. 15.8 (3.7) 14.0 {3.0) 7.5 (3.0) 
Short 
Same-Con. 16.6 {3.2) 14.6 (3.0) 7.3 (2.7) 
Same-Var. 17.8 {4.2) 13.3 {3.6) 7 .1 (2.9) 
Diff-Con. 15.3 (3.0) 13. 9 {3.5) 6 .1 ( 1 • 9) 
Diff-Var. 17.0 (2.2) 13.2 (2.6) 6.9 {2.2) 
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TABLE 2 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY OF CATEGORIESa 
Position 
B M E Mean 
., List 1 
.047 .050 .058 .153 
List 2 .066 .128 .093 .288 
List 3 .108 .141 .107 .354 
List 4 .081 .094 .025 • 201 
Mean .304 .412 .284 
a 
Percentage scores 
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ately analyzed within an appropriate ANOVA design. It should 
be noted, however, that before these analyses were conducted, 
the control variables of presentation series and task order 
were tested for any main effects or interactions. No sig-
nificant differences between series, F(2, 63) = 1.23; p •• 30, 
or task order, F(2, 63) = .23, were found. 
" 
To test for list accuracy, the probabilities of a cor-
rect list response for items from each list were computed, 
and analyzed within a 2 x 2 x 2 x 18 x 4 ANOVA design (Task x 
Presentation Pattern x Time x Subjects x List); with subjects 
nested within the Task x Pattern x Time interaction, and re-
peated across lists. A main effect for List was found, F(3, 
408) = 200; p. .001; with items from Lists 1 and 4 resulting 
in better discrimination than those from 2 or 3 (see Figure 
1 ) • 
There were no main effects for any of the between-
group variables. However, by comparing the upper panels with 
the lower panels in Figure 1, an interaction between Time and 
Pattern is indicated. The Varied condition enhanced list dis-
crimination for the Short time relative to the Long time. 
This interaction reached a level of statistical significance, 
F(1, 136) = 4-34; p •• 04. A simple effects analysis for the 
variable of Pattern showed that the differences between Con-
stant and Varied groups in the Short condition approached sig-
F I G U R E 1 
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nificance, F(1, 136) = 3.48; p •• 06. 
Position Accuracy 
To test for position accuracy, the correct response 
probabilities for each within-list position (i.e., beginning, 
middle, and end positions summed across all Lists) were com-
puted and-analyzed within a-2 x 2 x-2x 18 x-3 ANOVA design 
(Task x Pattern x Timex Subjects x Position); with subjects 
nested in the Task x Pattern x Time interaction, and repeated 
across Positions. A main effect for Position was found, F(2, 
272) = 30.9; p. .001; beginning items having better accuracy 
than middle or end items. 
Figure 2 describes the probabilities of correct posi-
tion judgments for all the experimental groups. By comparing 
the upper panels with the lower panels, an interaction be-
tween Time and Position is suggested. Under the Long condi-
tion, end items were better recalled than middle items; where-
as, under the Short time, end items were poorer than middle 
items, F(2, 272) = 3.24; p. .04. A simple effects analysis 
for the variable of Time showed that for end items, Long 
groups were significantly better than Short groups, F(1, 408) 
= 6.66; p •• 01. 
The position data were examined in more detail by sep-
arating the mean correct response probabilities for each po-
sition into two components: (a) the probability of a correct 
position response in the right list; and (b) the probability 
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of a correct position response in the wrong list (see Table 
3). From Table 3, it is clear that subjects tended to re-
member an item's within-list position, even when errors in 
list discrimination occurred. Note that for middle and end 
items, the response probabilities in the wrong list were gen-
erally equal to or higher than those in the right list. Such 
a pattern couldnot~occurr_unless_subjects were able to re-
triev~ position tags somewhat independently of list tags. 
Clearly, Hintzman et al's.{1973) finding (i.e., the tendency 
for correct·position responses in wrong list) for verbal stim-
uli, was replicated for picture stimuli in the present exper-
iment. 
List-~ Accuracy 
To test for List-Plus judgments, the response probabil-
ities for items from each of the three positions within each 
list were computed and analyzed within a 2 x 2 x 2 x 18 x 4 x 
3 ANOYA design (Task x Pattern x Time x Subjects x List x 
Position); with subjects nested in the Task x Pattern x Time 
interaction, and repeated across the List x Position inter-
action. Main effects for List, F{3, 408) = 91.9; p. .001; 
and Position, F(2, 272) = 76.9; p •• 001, were found. Items 
from Lists 1 and 4 were assigned more accurately than those 
from Lists 2 or 3, and the correct response probabilities for 
beginning items were better than those for middle or end items. 
From Figure 3, which depicts the response probabilities 
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TABLE 3 
POSITION DATA INTO SEPARATE COMPONENTS 
Probabilities of Correct Position Response 
Right List Wrong List 
----- - --- -
Groups B M E B M E 
" 
Long 
Same-Con. .28 .16 .15 .16 .18 .24 
Same-Var. .27 .16 .13 .17 .20 .26 
Diff-Con. .25 .13 • 21 • 21 .23 .20 
Diff-Var. .27 .16 .23 .16 .20 .17 
Mean Long .21 .15 .18 .18 .20 .22 
Short 
Same-Con. .30 .16 .15 .20 .22 .19 
Same-Var. .29 .18 .14 .15 .17 .20 
Dif:f-Con. .21 .14 • 11 .20 • 23 .21 
Di:ff-Var. .25 .18 .17 .17 .17 .16 
Mean Short .28 .16 .14 .18 .20 .19 
Total Mean .275 .155 .16 .18 .20 • 21 
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for all of the experimental groups, it can be seen that in 
7 of the 8 groups, beginning items from List 1 (1B), and end 
items from List 4 (4E) have the highest correct response 
probabilities. Thus, for the most part, the primacy and re-
cency effects reported for verbal stimuli (e.g., Hintzman et 
al., 1973) was further replicated in the present experiment 
for pictures. The only exception to that finding is seen in 
the condition of Short time, with Different tasks and a Con-
stant rate (second panel of Figure 3) • 
Confidence 
In addition to observing accuracy, the confidence of 
each subject's decision for each list and within-list posi-
tion was analyzed within a design described for List-Plus 
accuracy. For the most part, subjects• degree of confi-
dence corresponded to their degree of response accuracy; 
the higher the correct response probability, the greater the 
confidence. Table 4 shows the mean confidence judgments for 
each position within_ each list. Main effects for List, F(3, 
408) = 69.7; p •• 01; and Position, F(2, 272) = 13.1; p • 
• 01, were found; as well as a List x Position interaction, 
F(6, 816) = 57.3; p •• 001. 
Effects of Duration 
An analysis was also performed to test for any main 
effects or interactions for the variable of stimulus dur-
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TABLE 4 
MEAN CONFIDENCE OVER ALL SUBJECTS 
Position 
B M E 
List 1 4.06 3.10 2.88 
" 
List 2 2.69 2.75 2.79 
List 3 2.67 2.80 2.86 
List 4 2.88 2.94 3.29 
--
' ation. As mentioned earlier, in Varied groups stimuli were 
presented for one of three durations, with 4 sec. between 
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the shortest and longest durations. To test for the effects 
of stimulus duration, the raw number correct for each dur-
ation was computed according to each of the three scoring cri-
teria. These data were then analyzed within a 2 x 2 x 18 x 
3 .ANOVA design (Task x_Time x-Subjects x Duration), with sub-
jects nested in the Task x Time interaction, and repeated 
across Duration. On all three criteria, a main effect for 
duration was found: List accuracy, F(2, 136) = 3.45; p. .03; 
Position accuracy, F(2, 136) = 10.7; p. .005; List-Plus, F 
(2, 136) = 19.0; p •• 001. From Table 5, it can be seen 
that the long durations resulted in more accurate judgments 
than medium or short durations. 
Of particular interest in Table 5 is the absence of 
any main effects for total study time. M~~eover, there were 
no consistent differences between Long and Short scores for 
each of the durations (recall that durations in Long were 6, 
8, and 10 sec., and 3, 5, and 8 sec. in the Short condition). 
For example, on list discrimination, the scores of the Short 
groups tended to be better than those in the Long~ This 
corresponds to the previously reported finding that the Varied 
rate enhanced list judgments in the Short, but not in the 
Long condition. For position accuracy., o~ .. -th~ _ ot~er hand, 
Long groups tended to do better than Sho~_groups, a finding 
congruent with the fact that the Long condition facilitated 
List 
Long 
Short 
Mean 
Position 
Long 
Short 
Mean 
List-Plus 
Long 
Short 
Mean 
TABLE 5 
ACCURACY FOR ITEMS OF EACH DURATION 
(Mean Uumber Correct) 
s 
4.91 
5.55 
5.23 
4.16 
4.41 
4.29 
1.88 
2.05 
1.97 
Duration 
M 
5.33 
6.08 
5.70 
4.33 
4.02 
4.18 
2 .16 
2.16 
2.16 
L 
5.86 
5.80 
5.83 
5.61 
4.86 
5.23 
3.33 
2.11 
3.05 
Mean 
" 
5.37 
5 .81 
4.70 
4.43 
2.46 
2.33 
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performance for end items. Thus, it appears that time per ~ 
was not responsible for the duration effects. Rather, var-
iation of stimulus duration seemed to affect subjects in a 
relative fashion, within the context of a particular total 
study time. 
Mean Placement Qf Items 
Finally, an analysis was conducted to determine the 
effects of duration upon the mean placement of test items. 
Recall that each test item could be assigned to any one of 
12 line segments, representing each within-list position of 
every presentation list. Depending on where a subject assign-
ed a test item, his slash mark on the answer sheet was trans-
lated into a number corresponding to the particular line seg-
ment (i.e., 1 =beginning of List 1, 2 =middle of List 1, 
4 =beginning of List 2, etc.). These numbers were then 
analyzed within a 2 x 2 x 18 x 3 ANOVA design (Task x Time x 
Subjects x Duration); with Subjects nested in the Task x Time 
interaction and repeated across Duration. 
This analysis bears directly upon a prediction of 
strength theory; items of longer duration should result in 
stronger traces, and should, therefore, be assigned to more 
recent serial positions than items of shorter duration. Str-
ength theory would also expect a main effect for total study 
time, with Long groups assigning items to more recent serial 
positions than Short groups. Contrary to these predictions, 
there were no main effects for total study time; and in 
Varied groups, iteI)ls presented for the shortest durations 
(i.e., either 3 or 6 sec., depending upon the total study 
time) were assigned to more recent, rather than less recent 
serial positions, F(2, 136) = 4.85; p. .009 (see Table 6). 
" 
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TABLE 6 
MEAN PLACEMENT FOR ITENS OF EACH DURATION 
Groups 
Same-Long 
Diff-Long 
Mean-Long 
Same-Short 
Diff-Short 
Mean-Short 
Total Mean 
s 
7.09 
1.06 
7.07 
6.93 
6.82 
6.88 
6.98 
Duration 
M 
1.00 
6.75 
6.87 
6.90 
6.84 
6.87 
6.87 
L 
6.62 
6.62 
6.62 
6.68 
6.76 
6.72 
6.66 
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DISCUSSION 
Of the four hypotheses tested in this experiment, only 
two received some empirical support. The first one pre 1icted 
that Varied groups would be better list discriminators than 
Constant groups. It was found, in line with this prediction, 
that a varied rate enhanced performance, but only under the 
condition of Short study time. Failure to find the predicted 
effect under the Long time can be explained by recalling We-
Q 
ber's law: as the absolute value of a stimulus increases, 
sensitivity to change in the stimulus decreases. The varia-
tion in stimulus duration in the Long condition (6, 8, or 10 
sec.) was probably not as noticeable as the variation in the 
Short condition (3, 5, or 7 sec.). In support of this posi-
tion, it should be mentioned that many of the subjects in the 
Short-Varied groups commented that they were aware of the var-
iation in duration; whereas, few, if any, of the the subjects 
in the Long-Varied groups did the same. 
In the present experiment, it was hypothesized that a 
varied rate would enhance list discrimination through its ef-
fects upon the subjects' attentional state; which, in turn, 
would influence the slope of Hintzman's hypothetical Type A 
function. However, in view of the additional finding that 
list discrimination improved with stimulus duration, it might 
be argued that the varied rate enhanced performance only be-
cause, in that condition, some stimuli were presented for a 
longer time than in the Constant condition. This counter-
argument can be rejected for at least two reasons. First, 
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in the Varied condition, there were as many stimuli with dur-
ations shorter than those in the Constant, as there were 
stimuli with longer durations. Thus, the beneficial effects 
of the longer durations in th_e Varied condition would have 
been cancelled by the equal number of shorter durations. Sec-
ond, if the varied rate enhanced performance only because of 
longer durations,the effect should_also have been observed 
in the Long condition. Clearly, the data support t~e posi-
tion that a varied rate helps list discrimination because of 
its effects on subjects' attentional state. 
The other hypothesis to receive empirical support was 
one that predicted that subjects in the Long condition would 
, 
show more accurate within-list position judgments than sub-
jects in the Short condition. It was reasoned that a long 
study time would increase subjects' experience of cognitive 
strain during the processing of each list, thereby improving 
the discriminability of position tags (i.e., by increasing 
the disparity between the degree of load associated with be-
ginning, middle, and end items). Consistent with this pre-
diction, it was found that Long groups were more accurate in 
their judgments for end items than Short groups. Of partic-
ular interest, however, was the failure to find similar group 
differences for beginning and middle items. Moreover, if the 
Long condition increased the experience of cognitive strain, 
one would have also expected the discrimination between be-
ginning and middle positions to improve as well. 
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Why did the Long time affect end items only? A possi-
ble explanation can be found by recalling subjects' response 
biases shown in Table 2. For reasons not clearly understood, 
subjects assigned test items to response categories represent-
ing end positions much less frequently than they did to mid-
dle or beginning positions. This could be interpreted to 
mean that criteria, implicitly used by subjects to define and 
describe end positions, were much more stringent and precise 
than those for beginning or middle positions. It is also 
helpful to recall that "end" items were arbitrarily defined 
as those stimuli occupying the 13th, 15th, and 17th positions 
within each list. Thus, it was very difficult to distinguish 
middle items (7th, 9th, and 11th positions) from some of the 
end items. In the Short condition, the degree of cognitive 
strain associated with end items was probably not great enough 
to warrant their assignment to an end response category. In 
the Long condition, subjects probably experienced an added 
degree of strain while encoding end items, and this added 
amount would help them distinguish end positions from middle 
positions. 
Besides affecting within-list position judgments, the 
variable of Time was also hypothesized to affect list dis-
crimination. According to Hintzman, Block, and Summers (1973), 
the amount of time per ~ subjects spend in an experimental 
setting is a crucial factor in the accuracy of list judgments. 
Presumably, the longer the time spent in a setting, the more 
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likely it is that subjects will encode stimuli within a psych-
ological context (i.e., feelings of boredom) whose elements 
have reached an asymptote of change. Thus, it was predicted 
that list judgments would be better under the condition of a 
relatively short presentation time. The present experiment, 
however, failed to confirm this hypothesis; the variable of 
study time had no effect on list judgments. 
It could be argued that in ~he present experiment, the 
differences between the Long and Short presentation times were 
not large enough to show any noticeable differences in list 
discrimination. Recall that the presentation phase (includ-
ing task intervals) in the Long condition lasted for 15.6 
min., or approximately 1.3 times longer than the correspond-
ing time in the Short condition (12 min.). Obviously, fur-
ther research could test this argument by making the time 
differences between Long and Short groups greater. However, 
the present author has concluded that the variable of total 
time per~ will have little effect, even if the differences 
between Long and Short groups were more extreme. Moreover, 
from Hintzman's assumptions, it follows that the superiority 
of a shorter time should be most apparent in the beginning of 
a series. Thus, in the present experiment, Short groups_ 
should have performed better than Long groups in at least the 
first two lists. The data, however, do not agree with this 
expectation. In fact, the best performance for List 1 items 
was given by a group under the Long condition (see Figure 1; 
59 
Long-Same-Varied with .81 mean correct response probability). 
Rather than time per ~ in an experimental setting, it 
might be better to consider subjects' experience of time 
spent in a setting, as a crucial factor in list discrimin-
ation. Some psychologists have recently advanced the hypo-
thesis that a person's sense of duration is dependent, at 
least in part, upqn the number of stimuli he encodes in a 
finite interval of time. Ornstein (1974) and Block (1974) 
have both demonstrated that a time interval filled with the 
presentation of 80 stimuli appears to be longer than one 
filled with 40 stimuli. In the present experiment, the num-
ber of items encoded by the Long and Short groups were iden-
tical, and it is therefore conceivable that the experience of 
temporal duration in both groups was comparable. Thus, the 
failure to find differences between these groups in the pre-
sent study might be explained by considering Ornstein's da-
ta. If the experience of duration was equivalent in both 
groups, the hypothetical Type A function probably reached 
asymptote at similar points along the presentation series in 
both the Long and Short conditions. 
Failure to confirm the fourth experimental hypothesis, 
that predicted better list discrimination in the Different 
task condition, necessitates yet another revision of Hintz-
man' s assumptions regarding the Type A function. As explain-
ed earlier, Hintzman assumed that the function of Type A 
contextual change extended throughout the presentation phase 
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of an experiment. This implied that subjects' activities 
between, as well as within lists, would affect the slope of 
the function, and, thus, list discrimination. Contrary to 
that position, however, the present experiment found no evi-
dence that subjects' interlist activities affected list 
judgments. The subjective experience (e.g., feelings of 
boredom) associated with stimulus lists was the same, whe-
ther a novel OF repetitive task intervened between them. 
This latter finding is rather hard to understand in-
tuitively, especially in view of the fact that subjects were 
under the erroneous impression that the filler tasks were to 
be used as measures of their mental aptitudes. Most all of 
the subjects in the Different task condition appeared to be 
highly motivated during each type of task, and many of them 
expressed concern over their failure to complete the tests 
during the 2 min. intervals. In the Same task condition, 
however, many subjects reported that after the task type was 
repeated for the second time, they began to suspect their 
·true function in the experiment, and were, therefore, not as 
concerned about their performance. For this reason aJorre, 
one would have expected the different tasks to have had some 
effect on list judgments. Apparently, no matter how motivated 
or involved.subjects might have been with filler tasks, each 
succeeding presentation list was experienced in a similar fash-
ion. 
However, it is quite possible that the manipulation of 
Different tasks in the present experiment was not enough to 
alter subjects' psychological context. Moreover, it could 
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be that the subjects treated the filler tasks the same, re-
gardless of their nature. Perhaps a more powerful manipu-
lation would entail the comparison of Task/No-Task groups. 
Underwood (1969), for example, cited several studies to show 
that subjects allowed to engage in various physical activi-
ties between lists (e.g., walking out of the experimenta~ 
room for a drink of water) showed reduced inter-list inter-
ference on a paired-associate learning task. The reduced 
interference between lists was interpreted to mean that those 
subjects had established bet'ter temporal discrimination be-
tween the lists. As applied to the context hypothesis, this 
finding would lead to the prediction that various physical 
activities between lists would result in better list discrim-
ination than filler tasks between lists. 
There was another finding in the present study that was 
totally unexpected. In the Different-Short-Constant condition, 
subjects failed to show the usual strong recency effect for 
4E items. This was particularly surprising, since previous 
research has shown the recency effect to be quite pervasive 
(e.g., Guenther and Marigold, 1975; Hintzman and Block, 1971; 
Underwood, 1969). Until now, the only way known to attenuate 
this effect was by prolonging the time interval between the 
presentation of the last series items, and the time of test 
(e.g., Guenther and Marigold, 1975; Hintzman et al., 1973). 
Q 
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Hintzman et al. (1973) hypothesized that at short retention 
intervals, subjects infer additional recency information for 
items at the end of a series from the degree to which con-
textual elements associated with these items match context-
ual elements prevailing at the time of test. At longer re-
tention intervals, however, the degree to which elements 
retrieved with test items match prevailing contextual ele-
ments would be reduced. Thus, the attenuation of the re-
cency effect at longer intervals was explained. 
In the present experiment, however, the retention in-
terval between the presentation and test phases of the ses-
sion were identical for all experimental groups. Thus, 
Hintzman's hypothesis would be hard-pressed to explain why 
the Short-Different-Constant group failed to show the strong 
recency effect. No immediate explanation for this finding 
can be offered by the present author. However, the results 
clearly indicate that Hintzman's original interpretation for 
recency effects must be re-examined. 
Present Findings in Perspective 
The results of the present experiment indicate that 
·two of Hintzman's assumptions regarding the nature of con-
textual change (i.e., Type A elements) need to be revised or 
modified. First, time per ~ in an experimental setting does 
not appear to be the determining factor in the slope of a 
Type A function. Rather, time as experienced in a situation 
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might be a better way of conceptualizing the abcissa of a 
hypothetical Type A function. Second, Type A elements 
associated with list items appear to be unaffected by the 
nature of inter-list tasks. It is quite possible that other 
types of inter-list activities (i.e., activities that do not 
entail paper-and-pencil tests) could alter the slope of a 
Type A function, but further research is needed to deter-
mine this. 
" 
Although the above results contradict some assumptions 
regarding Type A change, they should not be interpreted to 
mean that all of Hintzman's ideas about contextual change 
are wrong. Quite the contrary, the present experiment did 
observe enhanced list discrimination with a varied rate (i.e., 
marginally significant under a Short time), and this pre-
diction followed directly from Hintzman's premise that sub-
jects attentional state (or "feelings of boredom" in Hintz-
man' s terms) ·is of fundamental importance in the formation of 
discriminable list tags. Furthermore, the fact that within-
list position judgments appear to operate somewhat indepen-
dently of list judgments agrees with Hintzman's notion that 
there are separate list (.Type A elements) and position (Type 
B elements) tags. Finally·, the finding that Long groups per-
formed better for end items than Short groups is congruent 
with the idea that Type B elements might reflect the degree 
of cognitive load or strain associated with stimuli. 
Of particular interest in the present study, was the 
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finding that in both Long and Short Varied groups, items of 
shorte.st duration were assigned to more recent serial po-
sitions than items of longer duration. As mentioned earlier, 
this result contradicts an explicit prediction of strength 
theory. The context hypothesis, however, is able to offer 
the following post-hoc explanation for these data. With 
relative increases in an ite~'s duration, the greater the 
likelihood that Type A and B elements associated with the 
Q 
item change during its presentation. (This would, by the 
way, also explain why the accuracy of judgments improved with 
relative increases in duration.) When a subject retrieves 
an item's contextual elements at the time of test, he might 
implicitly realize that some items are associated with a 
greater degree of contextual change than others. That is, 
items of longer duration would be associated with more context-
ual change than items of shorter duration. Because of this 
implicit recognition, subjects might have the tendency to 
assign longer items to less recent response categories. 
Moreover, according to Hintzman's interpretations, items are 
correctly assigned to the beginning of a series (i.e., the 
primacy effect) because they were encoded in the midst of 
greater contextual change. It could be that items of longer 
duration are assigned to earlier serial positions for the 
same reason. 
Conclusions 
In light of the above discussion, the present author 
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concludes that Hintzman's interpretations of the context 
hypothesis offers the best possible explanation for serial 
position knowledge that is currently available. It should 
be emphasized, however, that the Type A and Type B elements 
hypothesized by Hintzman are not meant to serve as explan-
ations for all types of recency phenomena. Rather, Type A 
and B elements appear to be the most likely mediators of 
contextual tags in tests of serial position. 
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